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1. Introduction 
Whatever the real meaning and primary famous saying 
of Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things" is 
ordinarily understood in epistemological sense, as a 
statement of the relativity of all human knowledge, of the 
impossibility of penetrate beyond the appearance of things. 
And this interpretation is consistent with the general trend 
of the times in which Protagoras lived. The doctrine of 
Heraclitus on the perpetual flow and universal vision of 
Parmenides that plurality and change are just a reflection 
of reality, the vain attempts to explain the nature of 
sensory perception and explain the illusions and 
misjudgments, along with the beginnings of consciousness 
(evident in Democritus) a subjective factor in the process 
of perception, all bordered philosophers to distrust what 
their senses showed and rely exclusively on their reason or 
intelligence. Reflection, however, it soon became clear 
that rational theories could not boast of greater 
consistency that experience of perception, and the 
inevitable result of this was that the relativism of 
Protagoras and his followers gradually became the 
skepticism of the Middle Academy. 
The modern relativism, on the other hand, although it 
tends to become skeptical, was originally a reaction 
against the latter. Hume (1964) had suggested about the 
validity of universal judgments of synthetic character, 
Kant (1978) proposed that we should understand them as 
coming not from the apprehension of the real nature of 
things, but the constitution of our due minds. Kant argued 
that experience mental factor, hitherto neglected, actually 
has a capital importance: it is responsible for the space, 
time, categories and all forms of synthesis. It is the formal 
element that comes from the structure of the mind itself 
constitutes knowledge and makes it what it is. Hume was 
wrong to assume that knowledge is an attempt to copy 
reality. Not so. The world, as we know, the world of 
experience, is related essentially to the human mind, from 
which derives everything a unity, order and form. The 
obvious objection to such relativism is the thing-in-itself, 
which is not and can never be an object of knowledge. We 
were thus locked into a world of appearances, whose 
nature is constituted by our minds. We can never know 
what Reality itself is. Yet that is precisely what, according 
to Kant, we want to know. The fascination of Kant's 
philosophy lies in the fact that it gave full value to the 
activity, as opposed to the passivity or receptivity of the 
mind, but the unknowable Ding-an-sich was an 
abomination, fatally like consistency and its power to 
solve the problem of human knowledge. Must be 
eliminated at all costs, and the easiest way to do this is to 
abolish it in the bud, leaving us with a knowable Reality 
because Reality and knowledge are one thing, and in this 
task, the mind, human or absolute, plays a definitive role. 
The relativity of Reality, which took the place of the 
reality of knowledge, has been designed in various ways. 
Occasionally, as in the case of Fichte and Hegel (1948), 
nature is opposed to the mind or spirit as two sides of the 
same thing: intelligence, or will, or even of the 
unconscious mind. Other times, Reality is conceived as an 
organic whole that somehow manifested in finite centers 
of experience, seeking to reproduce in them the Reality as 
it is. Unfortunately, they fail so that what they say, even 
being contradictory, must somehow be accepted as true. 
As true as other truths in the sense that they aim to express 
the Reality, but must be subject to an infinite 
reinterpretation before they become identical with that 
Reality to which they refer. 
Modern absolutist, realizing the inadequacy of this 
position, have returned some independence to the physical 
order, which does not depend for its existence on my 
perception, but it depends on my perception with regard to 
the qualities and relationships we found in it. In other 
words, the "who" of the real world is on our perceptual 
organs (Nescolarde-Selva, Usó-Doménech and Gash, 
2014). Or that reality, before it is known, is merely raw 
material, while what we call a "thing" or object of 
knowledge, is raw materials processed by an appropriate 
mental process that gives it the attributes of spatiality and 
like. Knowing, therefore, is to "induce the form of 
knowledge on the subject." 
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The relativity of Reality conceived that way, really 
means a return to Kant's position, except that instead of 
the thing-in-itself, with its character and unknowable 
properties, lies a kind of raw material, without qualities, 
attributes, or determinations, and consequently, as 
unknowable as the thing-in-itself, unknowable now 
because there is nothing to know. About that, modern 
idealism paired with pragmatism and humanism, who 
insist that Reality must be epistemologically seen as a raw 
material that is totally devoid of properties and totally 
indeterminate. The difference between the two views lies 
in that, for the idealist, the form is imposed on the subject 
by the very act by which we know it, while for the 
pragmatists, this does not happen until after a long 
nomination and experimentation process. 
In his "Essais sur la connaissance" (Essay on 
knowledge) M. Fonsegrive (1909) discussed at length the 
issue of relativism, and in his opinion we must grant in a 
sense that knowledge is relative to our faculties. But, 
although he makes this concession universally, in fact his 
own theory is that only our knowledge of corporeal 
objects is what is considered strictly relative. We can 
know other minds as they are because we ourselves are 
thinking beings, and the internal manifestation of our 
mentality and yours are of a similar nature. But "we know 
the essence of things, and the essence of our relationship 
with things. Among the laws of nature themselves, us know 
less than we do of our dealings with nature." “What we 
know, what known as the subject." The main argument on 
which rests this relativism is basically the same as used by 
Berkeley in his famous "Dialogue between Hylas and 
Filonio" (Stoneham, T., 2002). Hence, what we know is 
never the subject as it is in itself, but only as to our 
knowledge of it. Obviously, the above argument is valid if 
the notions of "being in itself" and "being known as" 
mutually exclusive, but not so as conceived by the realist 
or anti-relativist. Being in-itself merely means being as it 
exists, although it is not known. This means that the 
nature and existence of being is prior to our knowledge of 
it (a fact that holds firmly Fonsegrive), and does not mean 
that being, as it exists, cannot be known. The Fonsegrive 
argument (1909) proves nothing against the opinion which 
states that the real nature of the object is knowable, then if 
the thing, in the abstract, is not the thing exists that is 
known, in concrete, no reason not to actually existing in 
nature can be known, or, in other words, it cannot be 
known as it is. 
The argument that relativists to try to prove relativity of 
Reality are precisely similar to the above: We cannot think 
about real things, except insofar as they are objects of 
experience, from which it follows, its reality depends on 
your relationship with mind. This argument is patently 
false. All that proves is that things should be, or else 
become objects of experience in order to be known by the 
mind. But no proof that things must, by its very nature, be 
objects of experience. Unless Reality is intelligible and 
can fall within the experience, cannot become an object of 
thought. In no other way can the possibility of knowing 
the thing to assume its "connection to the mind." 
Definitely know something is to bring it to the field of 
consciousness, but it just continues to be conceivable that, 
things should be able to become objects of consciousness.  
Psychological considerations compel us to admit that 
Reality, when experienced, transformed, or better, is 
reproduced as a psychic fact, but we cannot conclude that 
the reality itself, the reality that is the object of the 
experience and which refers to our experience as 
something external to itself, necessarily a psychic fact. 
The experience or perception obviously are conditions 
without which we cannot think anything about things, 
much less think about them as existing, but that in no way 
means that the experience and perception are conditions 
that things may exist. When we think, not ordinarily think 
of things as objects of experience, but simply as "things", 
real or imagined. And we say the properties of the things; 
we thought as belonging to them and not super induced by 
our minds. However, our natural way of thinking could be 
wrong. Even granting that what "appears" is the Reality, 
appearances can be false. They may be fully or partially to 
our minds and, consequently, did not reveal the nature of 
Reality, but rather their relationship with us-as-earners, 
and with our faculties and our organs. 
Most of the arguments presented in support of this 
theory are based on psychology, and while psychology is 
good, the arguments are far from conclusive. We are 
invited to believe that abstraction and generalization are 
subjective processes involved in every act of knowledge, 
essentially modifying its contents. But abstraction is not a 
forgery, unless we assume that we are considering in the 
abstract as it exists in the concrete, that is, that there is not 
in connection with, and mutual dependence of other things, 
but isolated and independently, such as we understood it. 
Nor is false generalization, unless we assume, without 
proof, that there really are individuals to who potentially 
applies our concept. In a word, neither these nor any other 
of the subjective processes and ways of thinking destroys 
the validity of knowledge if we distinguish, as it should be, 
which is purely formal and subjective, of what belongs to 
the objective content and refers to the actual order the 
causes and purposes. 
Another argument is derived from the alleged relativity 
of sensation, from which all knowledge is derived in the 
scholastic theory of knowledge. It is said that the quality 
of sensation is largely determined by the character of our 
nervous system and, in particular, by the ending organs of 
our different senses. 
1. First, it is at least probable, however, that the quality 
of sensation is determined by the stimulus, and in any case, 
the objection is unnecessary because the judge did not 
refer us to our sense object as such, but as qualities whose 
ignore nature, although we know that differ in varying 
degrees. Even if we should grant that the feeling is on our 
specialized organs of sense, we cannot conclude in any 
way that the knowledge gained by the sense involves a 
subjective determination. 
2. Second, the data of the senses give us only 
qualitative differences, but also spatial forms and 
magnitudes, distance, motion, speed, direction, and these 
data are not based only mathematics, physical science but 
also in as the latter is related to the quantitative variations, 
and not only qualitative. 
3. Third, sensory data, but are partly subjective, are an 
objective cause as a condition. Consequently, a theory that 
explains the data of the senses, successfully assigned 
conditions that are no less real than the purposes to which 
they give rise, at least partially. 
4. Finally, if knowledge is really relative in the sense 
explained above, although it may satisfy our practical 
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efforts, can never satisfy the speculative. The goal of the 
speculative research knows Reality as it is. But knowledge, 
if only for appearances, would have no real meaning, and 
conceived as a kind of a priori idealism, neither would 
have a purpose. 
The Kantian commonly taught that the relationship is 
the category of categories. The matter and motion "consist 
of relationships." In fact, reality as we know it is nothing 
more than a set of relationships because "the nature of the 
mind is such that no knowledge can be acquired or 
expressed, and consequently no real existence can be 
conceived if not to through a system of relations" 
(Renouvier, 1891). 
This form of relativism can be called objective, to 
distinguish it from relativism we have discussed above, 
and which, in fact, is usually combined. This is, first, a 
theory of the nature of knowledge, but also a metaphysical 
knowledge to identify with Reality. Such a view is a 
theory of the nature of the relationship is very different 
from that of the Scholastics. For the latter, the relationship 
requires: 
1. A subject to which it belongs. 
2. Something special in the subject to explain what it 
preaches. 
3. A term, other than itself, to which it relates. 
A relationship, in other words, according to modern, 
presupposes their "terms". There is a mysterious and 
invisible link that somehow unites two aspects of one 
thing and makes them one. A relationship can be mutual, 
but if so, there are actually two relationships (e.g. 
Paternity and filiations) belonging to different subjects, or, 
if the same, arising from different principles. It is true that 
in science, as in other things, we learn a relationship 
without being able to discover the nature of the 
relationship linking entities. We know, for example, the 
pressure and temperature vary proportionately in a given 
mass of gas whose volume is kept constant, not knowing 
with certainty the final nature of the pressure and 
temperature. But we do know something about them. We 
know they exist, that each of them has a peculiar nature, 
and it is because of this nature that begins the relationship 
between them. We cannot know a relationship without 
knowing some of the things she relates, since the 
relationship presupposes their "terms". Therefore the 
universe cannot consist of relationships, but it must be 
composed of interrelated things. 
2. The Linguistic Access to Reality 
Our starting point is the recognition of Reality that is 
beyond us, but we can get in touch in different ways. We 
have two great tools to access this reality: 
1. Logical systems, to organize it and make it so 
manageable. 
2. Linguistic systems, to make it strong and well able to 
share it.  
Thanks to them (but not only them) build scientific 
theories and philosophical systems, discuss, argue, give 
lectures, write books, etc,... build new tools that we use to 
try to domesticate reality. The justification for this device 
is practical: we need to deal with Reality in order to 
operate on it, even when handling the somewhat disfigure. 
Given this radical difference between a continuous, 
complex and vast reality, and chop some tools that 
simplify and reduce to a manageable size. 
There is an inadequacy of language and discursive 
thought to express the reality, and, in general, the failure 
of systems to think about the world around us. The 
systematization, on the one hand is a natural tendency of 
the human spirit "as complete, makes everything 
symmetrical" and, moreover, is a trend that pays off many 
times, as the systematization brings simplicity and 
therefore, ease of management and foresight. But we 
would be dogmatic if we thought that useful tool can 
replace the real thing, or it can be applied with equal 
success to any reality. Put another way, the limitations of 
the two systems are: 
1. Simplify systems; there is something of the Reality 
that the scheme does not catch. 
2. Each individual situation is different; wanting to 
implement a known system instead of getting to the 
task of thinking is simply to refuse to look at the 
reality in front. 
A particular case of this mismatch between our tools 
and Reality shows noting the conventional character limits 
classifications. In the areas of our expertise, that is labeled 
as "matters of degree." We must recognize the vagueness 
of many of the concepts that is chopped reality. Since this 
is offered as a continuous gradual, our classifications 
artificially divide Reality and thus to try to apply shadow 
areas, cannot be said no thought of absolutely clear and 
precise manner such object is or is not within such class. 
But recognize the conventional nature of many 
classifications (and, therefore, the vagueness of its 
application) does not mean giving up your use but this 
recognition leads to know how to use the classifications 
without being driven by them. The classifications are very 
useful tools: are schemes to think, to describe, to teach and 
even to facilitate observation. But know how to use a 
classification needs to be aware of this instrumental. 
When this is understood, nothing prevents even that can 
serve different classifications for the same things: 
everyone can contribute something useful to the 
description of the reality that we know. And, even more, 
the next step in learning to think that complex reality will 
know that all language can be seen as a great filing system, 
and that the right attitude is, again, the use of it without 
being overcome by it. 
When we apply an attribute to a subject, what we are 
doing is to find a place under a simplified scheme in 
which the complexity of reality never quite fit. 
Consequently, to think it is necessary to distinguish the 
reality of their expression. And although this may seem 
banal advice, things are as they are, but when we try to 
explain how they are using the language, the nature of this 
tool prevents us from doing so finely tuned: we get always, 
whatever we try to do more or lesser generality, is a 
schematic representation, and therefore unsuitable in 
nature. Hence the danger of transferring the ontological 
plane that belongs to the linguistic level (attribute, for 
example, to the contradiction with the reality that 
sometimes we think it is useful). Again, think well 
requires recognizing the instrumental nature of Science, 
i.e. requires realizing that what they give us is not Reality 
and not the whole Reality. Moreover recognition that, is 
not to deny the true nature of science knowledge. The 
sciences are systems that humans use to understand the 
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world. Its schematic character provides distinct 
advantages over other types of knowledge (accuracy, 
reduction laws, predictability). But that same schematic 
character is the cause of a failure it is important not to 
forget. 
One advantage of philosophical thought about the 
scientist is that, being less mediated by previous schemes 
is able to recognize the difference between reality and 
systematization. The philosophy acquires, in addition, a 
paper clarifying respect to science. In his effort to think 
more directly the reality, the philosopher realizes the 
systematization of all instrumental and is thus more able 
to place science in place, recognizing its value but also its 
limitations. Differences between knowledge are not 
essential, but one of degree. 
Human knowledge is the deployment of a unique way 
to open up to the world, but it moves to deepen successive 
levels of analysis. For example, a certain level of 
knowledge would be that of a scientist who studies the 
movement drawing on the notion of force, but it is 
possible to move to a deeper level, in which the scientist 
analyzes the notion of force, even assuming assumptions 
(without analyzing) data of perception, and it is possible, 
still, a third deeper level where you begin to analyze the 
data before budgets, thus it passes insensibly to 
philosophy. Now, each new level represents a different 
level of generality and abstraction, on the one hand, and of 
clarity and precision, on the other. To deepen the 
knowledge, passes from the concrete to the abstract and 
from the general to the less general, and of the diaphanous 
to the opaque. All these levels are deep knowledge, not all 
knowledge is allowed to seize the same way. 
The highest degree of strength corresponds to the 
sciences: we have created tools with which we lock (or try 
to lock) accurate molds reality, and therefore "is very easy 
to see and describe", i.e. it is easy to think linguistically 
the Reality and communicate it to others. Captured by a 
language with precise meanings, knowledge is solidified; 
we can grasp with hands and lean on him. The 
systematization, rigid schemes of science are like a 
skeleton holding it up. But not just knowledge with 
scientific knowledge: it is possible (and inevitable) move 
to deeper levels. But as we go deeper, that is, as we think 
philosophically, we left those precise tools and try to get 
in touch with reality more directly, or what is the same, 
roughly bounded by fixed patterns. Without the rigid 
systems skeleton, knowledge then becomes fluid: the 
words are no longer defined as a contour and therefore is 
more difficult to communicate and agree. 
The left does not grasp, is the price paid for a plastic 
knowledge, which is better suited to the chiaroscuro of 
Reality. Delving abandons a very precise knowledge of a 
small piece of Reality, to scroll increasingly confused 
knowledge of ever wider areas of Reality. 
At the level of science schematized reality is easy to 
describe, and the language puts everything in its place, but 
what we see is thus only a very poor picture of what we 
had before. In-depth analysis widens the scope of known 
reality, but in confusion: "a more light more confusion", ie 
the more we soak in reality, is less systematized. And we 
realize, then, the artificial nature of those tools, that deep 
levels play no role. The attitude is good with the tools to 
take them for what they are and use what they are 
designed for. 
Science gives us knowledge of reality that has the 
advantage of clarity and precision: with sharp tools is 
much easier to handle reality (make it understandable data, 
make predictions, and discover new data...). But it would 
be absurd to believe that it is known to all, like trying for 
the same precision philosophy of science. In contrast to 
the strength of science, the advantage is that philosophy is 
concerned, in general, abstract realms of life problems but 
to pay the price of being content with knowing less solid. 
3. Reality and Linguistic Systems 
There are different kinds of objects, which are 
characterized by different mental acts through which 
perceive from its environment (Meinong, 1904). The 
objects of perception are different from those of thought 
but the latter are no less "objective" than the previous ones: 
they "apprehended" by thought, but not consist of it. 
Meanings and judgments are examples of this second type 
of object: Meinong's terminology, they "hold together" 
(bestehen), while individual beings and qualities "exist". 
In this sense, the objects of thought can be real without 
existing in the technical sense given by Meinong, and 
mathematical objects are of this kind. An intellectual 
inquiry is not linked to the empirical existence of objects, 
no existential presupposition is needed for their objects 
come and be given "real" in a sense exactly specific. The 
object as such is indifferent to the nature of existence. 
Analysis is needed of how speaking a language can be 
used on a given domain of objects. The first condition is 
(Agazzi, 1992) that these objects are there, and this is 
done through an act of speech, but through the presence of 
these objects in the subject's thinking. The 
phenomenological truth and the phenomenological 
situation such that an object just by being there, gives the 
subject an irrefutable and perhaps the only irrefutable 
witness him. This presence is the phenomenological 
situation covering this term through all possible ways to 
be present, and to suspend any judgment about the 
ontological status of what is present. The 
phenomenological truth has the following characteristics: 
1. It is unstable, because it enables the subject to remain 
within the Kingdom of the Truth when he leaves the 
immediate presence of being. 
2. It is private, because the presence of certain objects 
only to the individual and are really and instantly 
present. 
It is possible to say (Agazzi, 1992) that the fundamental 
function of language is to overcome these limitations, 
enabling the subject to "preserve" the truth somehow 
beyond the moment of its immediacy and making 
intersubjective. Thus, the characteristic of the truth that is 
intrinsic to the phenomenological situation is transferred 
to the language, as demonstrated by the fact that the 
common use of the term "true" referring to the 
propositions of a language. And when is attributed 
primarily denote a state of the objects which are present 
phenomenologically. But the language itself can enter the 
field of presence, and this, in two respects: 
1. Is present with its structures and forms. 
2. Is "denotant", that is, regarding the presence of 
another sector. 
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The referential position is the position of the 
phenomenological presence of the object. And the 
absolute truth of a sentence is the coincidence with the 
situation of the phenomenological presence. The language 
should have tools able to retain the presence of objects 
even if they are really there. And these tools are the 
meanings thus appear to be drawn from the referential 
situation, but not coincident with it, although even stay out 
of this situation. Meanings or are only partially 
understanding and "faithful" with respect to any particular 
phenomenological presence or referential situation might 
indicate. The concept "man" does not contain all the 
details of every single man could be denoted through it, 
but it is not doing that which is part of the condition to 
denote men who do not share all the details. 
The concepts are mental entities and, as such, are 
private. For collective evolution should be associated with 
the expressions of a language. This step determines the 
formal level, defined here as the fulfillment of conditions 
for the explanation and no ambiguity, so that the correct 
application of these conditions should enable for man to 
understand what other "means" using certain expressions. 
This phase entails the creation of a complex structure, 
since the small size of the present phenomenological 
analyzes not only through a complex network of mutually 
interwoven meanings, but the language itself must then 
somehow reproduce the complexity of this meaning -
structure so that it can express. This is the reason why 
action language semantics or ability to convey meaning, 
necessarily presupposes the possession of a certain 
syntactic structure. On the other hand we have a syntactic 
structure, different components of which can be seen as 
having the ability to convey meaning (Carnap, 1942, 1964, 
1967; Chomsky, 1963, 1965, 1969) in a way analogous to 
the meanings that are able to denote referents. The 
significant propositions also denote phenomenological 
presence say they are true, and an eminent part of the 
syntax is the exploration of the domain structure of "true 
statements". 
But a language (formal or otherwise) on the one hand 
says "more" and the other "less" about what is true of 
intentional or related models (Agazzi, 1992). This means 
that no language can fully express and properly 
phenomenological presence. The linguistic description of 
the subject is cheating with respect to what is present to 
his thought. Moreover, a party receiving a Subject 
linguistic communication will translate to denote a 
presence for him, and added additional failure. This is 
equivalent to saying that absolute truth is not 
intersubjective. Another limitation is that it can cover the 
whole domain of true propositions expressible in language 
(Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b,c,d; 
Nescolarde-Selva, Usó-Doménech and Gash, 2014; 
Nescolarde-Selva, Usó-Doménech and Sabán, 2014; Usó-
Domènech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012).  
Semantic Incompleteness Principle (Nescolarde-
Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b; Usó-Domènech and 
Nescolarde-Selva, 2012): It is not possible to totally 
characterize a structure of objects or processes, through a 
language (formal or not), or to totally even dominate a 
portion of "truth" that this language can express on these 
objects or processes through its deductive operation.  
Consequences: 
1. There is an inadequacy of the semantic dimension 
relative to the benchmark or phenomenological 
situation. 
2. There is a mismatch of the dimension in relation to 
the reference syntactical semantics. 
Language is relative as well. How can we speak about 
absolute being, then? We can and we cannot. But that we 
cannot completely speak about it, it is not a reason to stop 
speaking about it (Wittgenstein, 1953), because we can 
incompletely represent its completeness We would not be 
able to speak about anything, because languages are 
incomplete. Language is used inside a context. Depending 
of this context the language will be different. 
Semantic Incompleteness Principle is a consequence of 
Gödel's famous theorem (1931) and NWET Theorem 
(Usó-Domènech and J. Nescolarde-Selva, 2012, 2013)1. 
Mathematical instrumentalism construes some parts of 
mathematics, typically the abstract ones, as an instrument 
for establishing statements in other parts of mathematics, 
typically the elementary ones. Paseau, 2011, argues that 
though some versions of mathematical instrumentalism 
are defeated by Gödel’s theorem, not all are. By 
considering inductive reasons in mathematics, we show 
that some mathematical instrumentalism survive the 
theorem. 
4. Formal Languages: Gödelian Thought  
Referring to formal languages, mathematicians are 
reluctant to refer to the "existing concepts behind the 
symbols" as meaningless, or to claim that mathematical 
entities are non-existent, and it is sufficiently justified 
because of the pejorative nature open such terminology. 
The ontological status of mathematical entities, as matter 
of paradox, has a long history of philosophical debates, 
perhaps because of their close relationship to the problem 
of universals. Gödel strongly stated his own position 
(Gödel, K, 1934, 1964a,b): 
Classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived 
as real objects, namely: 
                                                          
1 Theorem of Non Wished Effects (NWET) (Usó-Doménech and 
Nescolarde-Selva, 2012, 2013) derived of Gödel theorem had demostred 
that the goal of reducing Reality to systemic conception (models) cannot 
be totally reached. For each constructed systemic conception, can happen 
to it one of the two following things:  
1. Either some allowed responses are not produced or  
2. Else some forbidden responses are produced.  
What would it mean to say that Reality is reduced to a given systemic 
conception? It would mean that system produces as response each 
allowed response of the Reality, but also forbidden responses for the 
system. That is to say: any allowed response is produced from the system 
but that forbidden response is so produced. To the forbidden responses 
produced by the system we will denominate no wished effects.  
In economics are often called “perverse effects”. In the social sciences 
are unintended consequences (sometimes unanticipated consequences or 
unforeseen consequences) are outcomes that are not the ones intended by 
a purposeful action. The concept has long existed but was named and 
popularized in the twentieth century by American sociologist Robert K. 
Merton. As example prohibition in the 1920s the USA, originally 
enacted to suppress the alcohol trade, drove many small-time alcohol 
suppliers out of business and consolidated the hold of large-scale 
organized crime over the illegal alcohol industry. Since alcohol was still 
popular, criminal organizations producing alcohol were well funded and 
hence also increased their other activities. Similarly, the war on drugs, 
intended to suppress the illegal drug trade, instead consolidates the 
profitability of drug cartels. 
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1. The classes as "pluralities of things" or like 
structures which consist of a plurality of things. 
2. The concepts as the properties and relations of things 
that exist independently of our definitions and 
constructions. 
It seems that the assumption of such objects really is as 
legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there 
is enough reason to believe in its existence. There is the 
same sense necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of 
mathematics as well as physical bodies are necessary for a 
satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions and in both 
cases it is impossible to interpret the propositions. 
These paragraphs should be tested extensively 
formulated carefully because they contain subtle but 
crucial distinctions. It must be admitted that there is an 
important difference between Gödel's statement that 
"Classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived as 
a real object" and "classes and objects are real objects." 
If it were a question of just how classes and concepts have 
been designed, then the fact employ "thing" in the 
language of mathematics could be considered as an 
extension of our everyday expected discourse, then one 
would have a fit, and heuristically valuable exposure 
method, perhaps devoid of ontological presupposition. 
Thus the choice of language does not seem justifiable 
epistemological priority areas, where Gödel apparently 
discovered that in the case of sensory perceptions, sense 
data are epistemologically priority to physical objects, the 
latter being an assumption necessary theoretical. 
Gödel makes a strong comparison between "the 
question of the objective existence of the objects of 
mathematical intuition" and the "question of the objective 
existence of the external world" which he considers to be 
"an exact replica". We are inclined to believe that this 
comparison does not respond to the fact that mathematics 
is not universally understood in the same way that the 
physical world which is "accessible" virtually everyone. 
Apply "mathematical intuition" in this way tends to 
establish that the mathematician is a "visionary", which is 
not precisely the intention of Gödel, because we like to 
believe that "mathematical truths" are as accessible as the 
"physical truths" i.e. common physical objects. However, 
if what Gödel says is that "physical intuition" is the 
intuition of physical, the comparison is more accurate, 
since physical entities are perhaps as equally "abstract" as 
those of mathematics. Arguments involving "our 
knowledge of the external world" are mostly a level of 
"furniture". 
Similar difficulties exist in the problem of mathematical 
objects and the problem of physical objects. In both cases, 
our everyday discourse is a "language of the thing." 
Although the question of our perception of physical 
objects has centered around the discussion of sensory data, 
it is difficult to build a similar entity for mathematics. 
Gödel, in his analysis of the Russell comparisons between 
"axioms of mathematical logic and the laws of nature and 
logical evidence to sensory perception" said arithmetic is 
"elemental mastery indisputable evidence that compares 
more appropriately to sensory perception." However this 
does not answer the question of how we "perceive" 
arithmetical truths. For the manipulation of symbols, this 
reduces in some way to the perception of physical objects, 
i.e. the symbols themselves. 
The "logical evidence" or "math data" can be seen as a 
test of numerical computations, and reasoning from tables 
and diagrams and as follows: 
The theorems of number theory are often 
generalizations of the "observation" of the calculations. 
Statements about prime numbers and multiples numbers 
can be considered as generalizations (laws) obtained from 
the convention that 7 is a prime, and 6 is a multiple, etc. 
Euclid's Theorem, claiming the infinity of prime numbers, 
can "verified" by the calculation as indicated above. 
Axioms of arithmetic allow us to demonstrate this 
assertion in general, to make it possible for these sensory 
perceptions can be deduced. For any given prime number, 
we have always been able to obtain one more. 
Tables and diagrams are shown to be the heuristically 
valuable in algebra and geometry. Historically, the 
geometry is the science of measuring physical objects. 
Tables can be used to list the elements of a group and the 
results of a particular composition to "verify" the theorems 
of group theory, such as "counting" the number of its 
subgroups. Such tables are an algebraic aspect of the 
"experiments with physical objects." 
The issue of computability is down to the ability to 
perform specific operations on the theoretical calculating 
machines, i.e. the task of representation "physical objects": 
the algorithms are frequently called calculations. This 
name originates from calculi (small pieces of limestone) 
that the Romans used for the calculations. 
Many problems "large cardinality" stem from the 
observation that certain infinite cardinal family have 
particular properties, and the question is about the 
existence of other (usually non-enumerable). 
Those propositions which, if true, are extremely strong 
axioms of infinity... Contradicting Mahlo axioms, the truth 
(or consistency) of these axioms are immediate 
consequence of the basic intuitions underlying abstract 
theory of sets. However, the new axioms are based on 
fairly strong arguments from analogy, such as the fact that 
are implied by the existence representation theorem 
Stone's of Boolean algebras with operations with many 
elements. 
If credible "perceive" or "experience" calculations 
examining mathematical objects and constructions, is in a 
position to offer an interpretation of Gödel 'real'. Gödel 
stated that he "believe that mathematical objects exist 
independently of our buildings and our having an intuition 
of them individually...". If mathematical objects were 
finite in number, "an intuition of them individually could 
be" possible. But this is not even possible for integers. For 
example, there is a finite and effective procedure by which 
we can test to see if an integer is prime number. Although 
it is possible in principle to test any given integer (not 
taking into account the amount of time and material 
required due to the current state of technology), it is 
impossible to test all integers. When you accept Euclid's 
theorem, one must accept the existence of a number is 
prime by Theorem Euclid, not because it has been proven. 
So we must recognize the existence of mathematical 
objects that we are unable to examine (experience), even if 
the domain is restricted to the infinite potential objects. 
Then the "phenomenalist" mathematician, who supports 
mathematical truths to the extent that they are verifiable, 
to examine calculations and constructions, shall be 
required to place a limit on the size of finite structures 
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permitted on the technological ability to scrutinize such 
objects. However, it may be objected that the 
"phenomenalists" mathematicians could accept these 
truths, which are theoretically "testable" by evidence, and 
cannot reject the potentially infinite need. Then appear as 
"theoretically verifiable", which it inevitably reduce some 
form of "normative behavior" of mathematical objects, 
and the problem reappears in a different form. 
Let us realize that Gödel distinguishes the existence of 
knowable: discussing the third form of Vicious Circle 
Principle, indicated that mathematical objects assumed to 
exist independently of our constructions, the third form of 
the principle is not violated if the means presume to 
assume existence and not for cognition. This tends to 
corroborate our identification of "experiential knowledge" 
with "examining constructions and calculations." 
Although "phenomenalism" mathematical extends to 
allow potential infinity, allows classical analysis, because 
it is unreasonable to maintain that a whole is uncountable 
"in principle subject to question." 
Taking the classical analysis as a criterion for "a 
satisfactory mathematical system", we are forced to 
acknowledge the existence of mathematical objects, which 
have no way, even from the beginning, to examine. Thus, 
mathematical objects exist independently of experience, as 
opposed to be phenomenal or apparent, and are therefore 
real. That is, replacing "regardless of our buildings and 
our having an intuition of his individuality" to 
"independently of experience." 
With the real interpretation given above, Reality is 
nothing more than a system of real objects. For a system 
of real objects, we mean that the objects of mathematics 
are governed by regularities. Axioms are mathematical 
objects as physical laws are to physical objects. One 
argument in favor of this view is the fact that no 
mythological allusion is in any of the writings of Gödel. 
Gödel seems to be saying that mathematical objects are so 
specific, so stable, and as well educated as physical 
objects, and that the axioms actually govern their behavior. 
In this respect, mathematical objects are neither illusory 
nor ephemeral, not any invention or any allegory. They 
are real. It can be seen, however, that one aspect of Gödel 
use of existence, its relationship to the criterion of clarity 
intimate, allows a comparison to their use other 
philosophers Descartes and Hume in particular. Gödel 
stated that he "only requires general math concepts should 
be clear enough value for us to recognize their courage 
and truth of the axioms about them. ...". Here we find a 
subtle but important distinction between intuition and 
clarity. We have an intuition of what can be said is clear. 
The concepts, for example of infinite totalities may be 
clear, however, our intuition of these entities may be quite 
weak. For example our intuition of elementary arithmetic 
and logic allows us to formalize such theories with strong 
enough convictions and general acceptance. Our intuition 
of large cardinal arithmetic, and logic exists about them is 
much weaker. No one can say that these arguments are 
immediate. However, most mathematicians would agree 
that these concepts are unclear, although it is something 
basic or primitive. For us to be able to distinguish two 
different powers of infinity is the evidence for the belief 
that the Dower concept of infinite is clear. 
Descartes (1960) discusses the concept of a triangle in a 
manner remarkably similar to the position held Gödel 
respect that mathematical entities are not mind-dependent. 
Descartes's commentary on the case of a triangle "maybe 
there can be anywhere in the world no figure outside my 
thought" raises a problem that some critics seem to 
misunderstand Gödel. Gödel is indicating that there is an 
analogy between the existence of mathematical objects 
and the existence of physical objects. He never claimed to 
be physical objects, or existed in space and certainly not in 
any "mythical" sky. How can there then? Perhaps in the 
sense of Max Hume (1964): 
'Twill not be surprizing after this, if I deliver a maxim, 
which is condemn'd by several metaphysicians, and is 
esteem’s contrary to the most certain principles of human 
reason. This maxim is that an object may exist, and yet be 
no where: and I assert, that this is not only possible, but 
that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this 
manner. 
The computability or physical interpretations are of 
secondary importance. Depends if it is understood in the 
sense of actual real physical existence (in space and time), 
and then mathematical objects are not real. Subsequently 
factual and reality are often considered synonymous, and 
if it can be a source of confusion. 
Another aspect of existence in mathematical contexts 
should not be confused with "the existence in terms of 
clarity", is the existence in the sense of consistency. 
Mathematicians often wonder if there are certain objects 
which properties are specified. In the context of the 
discussion, it is clear that the question being asked is 
whether the assumption of the existence of such objects is 
consistent with other axioms that have been alleged, and 
unfortunately, they are not always specified. 
One might ask whether Gödel believed that 
mathematical truths are "eternal" since he thought that 
mathematical objects exist "independently" of the 
experience. We cannot see the inconsistency of 
mathematical existence and eternal mathematical truths. 
We can resist any effort to read "mythology" in their 
thinking about the existence of mathematical objects. 
Gödel's realism, then, can be seen as a form of scientific 
realism without mythological or ontological commitments. 
So your ideas agree with Carnap (1942, 1964, 1967), and 
are a fact indicative of his belonging to members of the 
Vienna Circle. 
Ontological questions arise in considering mathematical 
objects as real objects, "believing in its existence" 
represent an area of contention among many philosophers 
who, for the most part, they agree on the methods and 
content of mathematics. These critics do not dispute the 
clarity or the need for a proper development of the 
language, as it was understood by Gödel, but cannot agree 
with the ontological status of mathematical objects. 
Arguably the viewpoint that the content and mathematics 
methods are crucial, however, ontology is secondary or 
should be ignored completely. Therefore it is considered 
that these disagreements do not make any changes to the 
content or mathematical methods, because they are seen as 
linguistic or verbal disputes, arguments over words and 
not things. 
Gödel's realism, while similar to Locke and Leibniz, 
emphasizes the fact that "forces us axioms taken as true." 
This neither answers a question, nor touched nor Locke 
and Leibniz, why choose a system or a set of axioms, and 
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not another and that the choice of a mathematical system 
is not arbitrary. 
Recently, Kjeldsen and Carter, 2012 addresses the topic 
of the growth of mathematical knowledge with a special 
focus on the question: How are mathematical objects 
introduced to mathematical practice? 
5. Conclusions 
According to Watts (2006), to study Eastern 
philosophies, especially Zen, it is remarked that the world 
of events and entities are measured terms than 
phenomenological realities. To fulfill its function 
(linguistics), the names and terms should be syntactic 
fixed like all the other units of measurement and 
comparison. But their use is so successful that the danger 
of confusing these terms of measurement and comparison 
(model) with the measured world, to confuse convention 
with ontology, to reduce the rich reality to the model. 
Linguistic structure which we form judgments or 
propositions not allow a transitive verb without a subject 
or predicate. As says Watts (2006), when there is 
"knowledge", the grammatical convention requires the 
existence of the knower and that which is known. Man is 
so used to it that when we talk and think, to build our 
models, does not realize that it is just that, a convention, 
and that does not correspond to the actual experience of 
knowledge. 
The greatness and tragedy of man, of his greatest 
adventure, knowledge, oscillates between two 
mythological characters Prometheus and Sisyphus. The 
first stole fire from the gods. The second was condemned 
eternally up a rock and reach the summit, which is rolled 
at the foot of the mountain, so, eon after eon, resuming the 
work useless. Stone of Sisyphus, with its eternal and 
useless foot roll to the top. The fire of knowledge itself 
drags the ashes of ignorance. Linguistic structures 
themselves impede the full apprehension of Reality. 
Just being aware of it, just knowing our limits, we can 
begin to catch a glimpse of the Reality that is being 
continually denied. And the only way we will achieve a 
basic principle of knowledge, which is so forgotten: 
humility. 
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